sion, a commitment to that vision, and political savvy can effectively centralize its civil rights enforcement efforts. The Reagan administration, contrary to popular wisdom, lacked both a clear ideological vision with respect to civil rights and a commitment to pursue that vision. Instead, the administration viewed civil rights as a matter to be worked out through the tugs and pulls of politics. Consequently, civil rights centralization took a back seat to tax reform, federalism, and deregulation objectives.
Reagan administration civil rights enforcement efforts also were marred by political ineptitude. Unwilling to work within the political culture they inherited, Reagan political appointees sacrificed gains in enforcement by engaging in pitched and counterproductive battles with Congress and the civil rights community. A more adept administration, contrary to Graham's assertions, would have made far more progress in advancing its agenda.
Conservatives who bemoan the death of the presidency are in error. The presidency -albeit constrained -remains potent. By summarizing and extending Graham's work, this review provides a glimpse into the exercise and management of presidential power.
I. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA DESCRIBED
Graham describes his work as a story about a "social movement[ ]" which "broke the back of the system of racial segregation" (p. 3). As such, Graham considers all federal action in the civil rights arena fair game for investigation. From this huge smorgasbord, Graham has chosen employment, voting, fair housing, and the equal rights amendment. By book's end, however, it is apparent that only one issue truly matters to Graham. The dominant target of Graham's study is employment -both the enactment and enforcement of statutory antidiscrimination prohibitions and executive initiatives to increase minority employment among government contractors.
Graham accomplishes much through this choice of emphasis. First, employment best reveals the "full policy cycle" that Graham seeks to penetrate. Unlike court-driven school desegregation and voting, employment policy is fundamentally the domain of the administrative state. Second, the shift from individual protection to group rights was played out more explicitly in the employment context than in any other area.
The inclusion of other select topics, then, enriches and provides a broader frame for understanding the establishment and evolution of employment policy. To the extent that Graham intends to tell a comprehensive story of 1960-1972 reforms, moreover, these otherwise ancillary matters are essential. In any event, Graham's discussion of voting, housing, and equal rights -even if tangential -provides important insights to these topics. The housing chapter, for example, Expediency also plays a large role in Graham's account of the Nixon administration's handling of voting rights. As part of his strategy to woo southern Democrats to the Republican party, Nixon unsuccessfully sought repeal of the 1965 Voting Rights Act requirement that southern states "preclear" any electoral changes that would adversely affect minority interests.23. Nixon's efforts in voting rights also reveal the close nexus between bureaucratic structure and civil rights policy. In 1969, the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department was reorganized from sections corresponding to geographic regions to sections organized by function. With respect to voting, the reorganization "'had the unanticipated consequence of producing an experienced team of attorneys dedicated to furthering [preclearance Voting is important for another reason. The preclearance provision in the 1965 Act, according to Graham, was the first "hint[] of a radical shift from procedural to substantive criteria in civil rights law, from intent to effect, from equal opportunity as a right to equality as a fact and as a result" (p. 174). The story of this shift lies at the heart of The Civil Rights Era. It is a story told by reference to executive fair employment initiatives, antidiscrimination laws passed by Congress, and agency initiatives.
A. The Kennedy Years
The Kennedy era, despite Graham's meticulous one hundred-page account, reveals surprisingly little about the shift from fair treatment to just result objectives. "Insecure in his relations with Congress" (p. 65), Kennedy ducked an activist role in civil rights issues until his hand was forced by racial violence in the South (p. 66). Indeed, Kennedy balked at including an antidiscrimination-in-employment provision in proposed federal civil rights legislation.25 The White House, instead, endorsed a combination of voluntary efforts by private business (Plans for Progress), in which the administration served as cheerleader,26 and an interagency committee headed by Vice President Johnson designed to ensure nondiscrimination in the awarding of federal grants. Without real authority over federal grants or loans, affected agencies subordinated antidiscrimination objectives to their own interests in efficient procurement and "back-scratching mutuality" with existing contractors (p. 44). As Graham notes, "the President's unifying command and power" (p. 44) is prerequisite to centralization of otherwise diffuse agency interests. Without strong presidential leadership, as the Kennedy experience reveals, department and agency heads will view themselves as kings over their discrete domains.
The Kennedy years are revealing for another reason. The origins of affirmative action can be traced to a Kennedy executive order requiring government contractors to take "affirmative action to ensure that applicants [and] . . . employees are treated ... without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin."27 Graham is quick to point out the irony that this "affirmative action" demand called for nothing more than the fair treatment objective of eliminating discriminatory employment practices (pp. 34, 41). Indeed, when asked his views of demands by black leaders for "job quotas by race," Kennedy responded, "I don't think we can undo the past .... ognizes the speech to be a foreshadowing of a "crucial transition" (p. 174).
Ironically, the true precursors to the shift to numerical equality are two events soundly rooted in fair individual treatment objectives. First, in a nonpolicy-driven reorganization of federal civil rights enforcement (p. 184), President Johnson entrusted with the Secretary of Labor the responsibility to ensure that government contractors "as an initial part of their bid" comply with the preexisting demand that "affirmative action" be taken to root out discrimination on the basis of "race, creed, color, or national origin."35 Better known as Executive Order 11,246, this reorganization ultimately set in motion the demand for adequate minority representation among federal contractors.36
Second, a White House team comprised of Robert Kennedy, Nicholas Katzenbach, and Burke Marshall worked with Republican Senator Everett Dirksen to assure passage of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and, with it, to create the EEOC. Graham convincingly shows that Title VII was designed both to avoid the imposition of numerical hiring demands on employers and to limit the sweep of EEOC power (pp. 125-52). Title VII provisions require proof of discriminatory intent,37 prohibit the granting of "preferential treatment" to attain racial balance,38 and protect an employer's right to use professionally developed ability testing unless it was "designed, intended, or used to discriminate."39 The EEOC was denied the "cease and desist" powers of investigation, litigation, and adjudication typically associated with independent agencies. Instead, the EEOC's role was limited to complaint-processing associated with private enforcement.40 According to Graham, this limited role was pushed by Dirksen to protect employers from "harassment" by "a new mission agency like the EEOC" (p. 146). Despite these structural and statutory limitations, 35 the EEOC emerges as the lead actor in pursuing numerical measures of equality. Surprisingly, while EEOC enforcement efforts and Executive Order 11,246 demands are rooted in the activist Johnson presidency, the Nixon administration proved more than complicit in advancing these Johnson initiatives. Graham's tale of the transformation of civil rights policy from nondiscrimination to group rights, then, is a story of two administrations. Indeed, as The Civil Rights Era amply demonstrates, Nixon administration efforts often proved as important as Johnson initiatives in cementing both EEOC efforts and the 11,246 program.
The EEOC
Graham's portrait of the EEOC, albeit incomplete,41 is revealing on several fronts. It shows that an agency's nascent stages play an extraordinary role in shaping agency policy. Authorizing legislation is often a tabula rasa to be fleshed out by the agency through its implementing regulations and interpretations. In the words of Alfred Blumrosen, a key staffer during the EEOC's early years: "A new administrative agency has vast opportunities to demonstrate creative intelligence in its initial decisions. These decisions, made by a handful of men and women who comprise the initial staff, reverberate through time and space in a tidal wave of consequences for both procedure and substance."42 With respect to the EEOC, Graham demonstrates that the early years at the agency set in stone critical agency interpretations of both its own authority and substantive Title VII law. These interpretations, moreover, are emblematic of early EEOC efforts to transform Title VII from what was -according to Jack Greenberg -a "weak, cumbersome, [and] probably unworkable" set of provisions43 into the most powerful civil rights statute. Finally, although this point is subject to question,44 Graham concludes that White House indifference allowed the EEOC to be captured by the "increasingly militant civil rights constituency."45
Graham's account also shows that the life of the law is its imple- 44. Indeed, in many instances, the EEOC, not the NAACP, played the lead role in advancing broad-ranging interpretations of Title VII. For example, EEOC lawyers initiated the substitution of disparate impact standard for intent-based proofs. P. 250. In fact, one of the most surprising revelations in Graham's account is early NAACP opposition to minority identification in institutional records. Although the EEOC intended to monitor equal employment efforts aggressively through such identification, NAACP officials cautioned that "the minute you put race on a civil service form, the minute you put a picture on an application form, you have opened the door to discrimination." P. 199.
45. P. 157. This phenomenon -whether it be described as "capture" or merely extraordinarily amicable relationships between the EEOC and its constituents -is revealed in EEOC efforts to assist civil rights organizations in their litigation efforts. P. 244. mentation. Senator Dirksen's efforts to limit the EEOC's role statutorily to complaint-processing were subverted by artful interpretations of Title VII. For example, statutory language disfavoring general recordkeeping requirements was sidestepped by agency claims that state data is too inexact to support systematic national monitoring (pp. 193-97). This interpretation was later characterized by Alfred Blumrosen as a creative reading of the statute "contrary to the plain meaning."46 A more striking example is the EEOC's filing of amicus briefs to express its substantive views on Title VII law despite Congress' explicit prohibition of EEOC-initiated litigation.47 This enabled the EEOC to argue in court that Title VII outlawed employer practices "'which prove to have a demonstrable racial effect.' "48 The EEOC recognized that its "constructive proof of discrimination" reading was at odds with explicit statutory language and hence unlikely to receive judicial approval.49 To the agency's and the civil rights community's delight and surprise, in Griggs v. Duke Power, the Supreme Court validated this broad reading.50
Implementation is a two-edged sword, however. Whereas EEOC efforts to eradicate race discrimination reveal the power of aggressive enforcement, early EEOC lack of interest in gender discrimination made a mockery of this statutory prohibition. As Representative Martha Griffiths observed in 1966, the EEOC was "'wringing its hands about the sex provision'" so as not to "'interfere with the 46 Graham's portrayal of the EEOC reinforces themes well known to students of the modem administrative state: the identity of interests between interest groups and agencies, the transient nature of original legislative intent in the face of conflicting agency priorities, the sweep of agency power in its early statutory constructions, policymaking by way of resource prioritization, and the power of the judiciary to "codify" agency constructions. Graham's depiction also suggests that the law as put into effect by an administrative agency may not be a law that would receive prior congressional approval. Indeed, the Dirksen compromise so central to Title VII's enactment stands in striking contrast to the Griggs-era EEOC. Agency subversion of legislative purpose is only half of the story told by The Civil Rights Era; the other is de facto presidential legislation by way of executive order.
Executive Order 11,246
The true embodiment of the shift from nondiscrimination to group rights is Executive Order 11,246.57 Although numerical disparities played a central role in EEOC enforcement, these disparities were deemed a proxy for purposeful discrimination. In contrast, the numerical targets of Executive Order 11,246 are a requirement for contractors who do business with the federal government. Specifically, the order demands an "acceptable" affirmative action program that requires adequate "utilization of minorities and women, at all levels and in all segments of [the] work force where deficiencies exist."58 opinion] that was then taking place" to Nixon's preoccupation with "opposing the grant of cease and desist authority." H. BELZ The Civil Rights Era both gives short shrift to early EEOC initiatives and deemphasizes the significance of the early endorsement of group rights by civil rights groups. As a result, Graham goes too far in suggesting that, over time, the EEOC was captured by its clientele interests.74 The truth, instead, is that the EEOC was an agency with a mind of its own.75 Graham also errs in suggesting that forces of nature inexplicably coalesced in the latter stages of the Johnson presidency and, suddenly, civil rights enforcement was transformed from its liberal individualistic base to a group rights approach. While their 67 75. This phrase derives from the title of Phil Lyons' article on EEOC testing. See Lyons, supra note 70. In saying that the EEOC has a "mind of its own," I do not mean to suggest that the EEOC operated in a vacuum. For example, key EEOC staff came from the civil rights community. This commonality helps explain the lead role that the EEOC played in advancing the agenda of civil rights interest groups. However, the EEOC was not involuntarily "captured" by these advocacy groups. This distinction is not merely semantic. A "captured" agency does not determine its policy agenda; an agency that sees eye-to-eye with interest groups may well control its policy agenda. potency increased over time, the use of numerical proofs seemed evident at the 1965 White House Conference. Ironically, the EEOC's ability to disregard the delicate political compromise of 1964 lends force to Graham's assertions of agency power. Consequently, these criticisms suggest that Graham's arguments are even stronger than his own presentation reveals.
Graham's history is also subject to attack for its selectivity. School desegregation, the tax exempt status of private schools, and Nixon administration efforts to provide special assistance to minority entrepreneurs are hardly mentioned in this volume. This is unfortunate. the package of civil rights legislation submitted to Congress.81 However, with Title VI's demand that federal grant recipients not discriminate, Congress became willing to pump billions of dollars of aid for the compensatory education of educationally deprived children. (Indeed, this conditioning of federal aid upon the nondiscriminatory status of the aid recipient prompted strong resistance to ESEA by southern members of Congress who were concerned that the money would be used to force desegregation.) These billions of dollars were sufficient incentive for many school systems to comply with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) nondiscrimination standards.
The story of early enforcement of Title VI by the OCR parallels EEOC efforts to strengthen Title VII: agency interpretation in tandem with court action mandating change. As OCR read Title VI's legislative history, its requirements were consonant with current court rulings.82 As a result, it interpreted Title VI's desegregation requirements as being both flexible and potentially expansive. Regulations issued by OCR in December 1964 stated that districts would be considered in compliance with Title VI if they were subject to a court order or if they submitted a desegregation plan subsequently approved by the Commissioner of Education.83 As judicial standards developed calling for the immediate elimination of dual school systems, and as the passage of ESEA in 1965 made Title VI enforcement in southern school districts of particular concern to HEW officials, "a device for gradual transition" was converted "into an engine of revolution."84
The initial Title VI guidelines, issued in 1965, required the desegregation of all grades by 1967.85 In 1966, OCR issued revised guidelines setting performance standards for desegregation in affected districts; these guidelines also mandated faculty integration.86 The revised guidelines set more rigorous standards for freedom of choice plans, reflecting increasing concern that these plans were intended primarily to maintain dual school systems, not dismantle them.87
The parallel between the OCR and the EEOC ends here. In 1969, with the Nixon administration in office, both the executive and legislative branches increasingly opposed the federal courts and the OCR on school desegregation questions.90 Increasing emphasis on numerical measures of equality by both the OCR (to measure discrimination) and the courts (to remedy discrimination), as well as mounting concern over the extension of desegregation to districts outside the South and heightened opposition to busing, provoked a political reaction ultimately resulting in the taming of federal school desegregation enforcement efforts. 93. The all-important dialogue which takes place between agencies and oversight committees is strikingly absent from The Civil Rights Era. trump is (or is not) exercised is an important matter not addressed by Graham.
The OCR experience is revealing in quite another way. Despite its overt reliance on numerical proofs, the EEOC was not subject to the same limitations as the OCR during this period, for Title VII -unlike Title VI -was enforced through the courts by private parties. In other words, since the EEOC did not directly enforce its interpretations of Title VII, the structural relationship between the courts, the elected branches, and the agency was different here than with the OCR. Where the OCR -like most federal offices -is especially vulnerable to presidential appointments and congressional funding, the judicial enforcement model of the EEOC provides an important layer of insulation between Title VII and elected government.94 The Civil Rights Era recognizes this critical distinction (pp. 469-70); but, by failing to compare the EEOC to other enforcement agencies, Graham's work is inadequate to the task of explaining the relationship between bureaucratic structure and agency performance.
Federal equal educational opportunity enforcement also can be contrasted to Title VII enforcement with respect to the related question of tax exemptions for racially discriminatory private schools. Segregated private schools, sometimes aided by state subsidies, significantly impeded the achievement of nondiscrimination objectives in education during the 1960-1972 period (and in the present day).95 From 1966 to 1972, enrollment in segregated private schools in districts subject to desegregation orders rose from 25,000 to 535,000.96 Yet before 1970, federal enforcement efforts were generally limited to the Title VI prohibition of direct financial assistance to discriminatory private schools.97
The rise of segregated private schools contributed to the racial stratification of public education by removing white children from public school systems. Making matters worse, the IRS indirectly supported this undermining of public school desegregation through tax breaks to segregated schools.98 Consequently, in 1967, the U.S. Civil 94. Another difference is that EEOC enforcement is, for the most part, a factor worked into the initial hiring decision. The EEOC influence then affects a limited number of people in an undetectable way. In contrast, the busing issue is extraordinarily visible and raises concerns that affect everyone, namely, the safety and schooling of children. This minority specification was rooted in a rather creative reading of the 1967 statute. The SBA assumed that, by referring to "low income" individuals in the statute, Congress' concern was not simply economic disadvantage but also social disadvantage. In addition, the SBA assumed, as SBA head Thomas Kleppe put it, that "'minority' is a shorthand for the phrase 'socially or economically 
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119. Id. at 10. Minority business enterprise, race and education, and employment testing strengthen Graham's central contentions about the ascendancy of group rights and the ability of agencies to transform legislative priorities. These issues also are instructive in stating the complex interchange that takes place between the agency, interest groups, the White House, and Congress. The Civil Rights Era, with its "full policy cycle" emphasis, would have been well served by the inclusion of these topics.
III. REAGAN CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF WHITE
HOUSE CENTRALIZATION
The explicit and implicit conclusions of The Civil Rights Era suggest an enfeebled presidency. Graham gives several reasons for this. First, the "full policy cycle" reveals that career bureaucrats, not political appointees, ultimately hold the key in the running of government agencies (p. 7). Second, triangular power relationships that form among an agency, its legislative oversight committee, and its constituent interests effectively foreclose active White House involvement in the running of government (p. 470). Third, to the extent that agencies disregard constituent interests, the judiciary will likely impose these constituent desires on agencies (p. 470). Fourth, agency power is at its apex immediately after the enactment of legislation. During this period, agency statutory interpretations -validated by court opinions -shape the meaning of legislation into a form acceptable to the agency.127 Correlatively, although Graham does not make this point, agencies are circumscribed in their ability to "recreate" their legislative mandate once court opinions cement agency constructions. In other words, a White House that inherits a preexisting enforcement scheme has rather limited options.
See supra text accompanying notes 42-53.
Graham's proof of these propositions is wanting. Furthermore, some of these propositions are suspect. While it is indisputable that careerist attorneys in both the Justice Department and the EEOC helped shape agency policy, there is no reason to suspect that these policy directions were not in accord with the desires of political appointees. In fact, the Nixon and Johnson administrations' support of sweeping civil rights initiatives suggests just the opposite. Moreover, even if careerists unilaterally shaped policy in the Nixon and Johnson years, that does not mean that a president ideologically opposed to this careerist vision could not retool the agency to suit his priorities. For example, President Reagan sought to undertake such a retooling in several government agencies.
Graham's failure to discuss relationships between oversight committees and either agencies or interest groups is also problematic because it makes his assertion about "iron triangles" pure speculation. Moreover, the mere potential that such triangular relationships may form does not mean that that potential will be realized. During the Reagan years, for example, relationships between agencies, on the one hand, and oversight committees128 and interest groups129, on the other hand, were often testy. Finally, although the courts often impose constituent views on agencies, courts -at least during the Reagan years Enforcement agencies seeking to repeal existing programs are likely to confront a potent legislative attack. FCC efforts to rescind the granting of preferences to minority broadcasters were greeted by the enactment of single-year funding restrictions forbidding such reconsideration.173 This direct challenge to existing rulemaking, combined with the FCC's repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, "so poisoned relations between the two entities that it stimulated congressional oversight of a magnitude Washington insiders say is unprecedented."174 Congress has used its power of the purse in other ways to correct agencies which disregard their past and, with it, legislative preferences. Such was the fate suffered by the Reagan appointee driven U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Unwilling to play ball with Congress, the Commission -in addition to being subjected to an extensive GAO audit'75 -had its appropriations severely reduced and was directed by Congress to pursue specified research priorities and to allocate its appropriations internally according to a restrictive legislative formula.176 Finally, Congress used its confirmation power to punAction is Here to Stay, FORTUNE, Apr. 19, 1982, at 143, 162. The primary cost of swimming against the political current, however, is the cost of doing battle with civil rights interest groups. For those who oppose numerical proofs of discrimination and affirmative action programs, the power of civil rights is analogous to powerful special interests throughout government. The difference in civil rights is that, unlike farm supports, trade tariffs, etc., policymaking implicates fundamental moral and economic concerns. This is a difference that matters. At the same time, the focus of concern should not be the efforts of special interests (for democratic free market politics dictates that special interests will advance their claims); instead, the focus should be on the ability of elected government to distinguish civil rights concerns from other types of concerns.
173 The Reagan years then tell a cautionary tale about executive power. Implementation strategies with modest objectives can move agency policymaking in the direction of administration priorities. However, once constituency and congressional expectations are well settled, efforts to replace existing approaches with a new regime will meet tremendous resistance. Since Congress holds the ultimate trump card with, among other things, its power of the purse, direct attacks such as those launched by the FCC and Civil Rights Commission seem doomed to failure. Consequently, after the enactment of legislation and promulgation of initial agency regulations and interpretation, executive power lies principally at the margins. As such, White House centralization efforts cannot rewrite the nation's civil rights agenda. Furthermore, only a jerry-rigged structure can be assembled with the tools of executive power -appointments, reorganization, policy prioritization -and hence it is unlikely for a president to establish a civil rights legacy.
Reagan's Legacy. Aside from judicial appointments, Reagan's attempts at centralizing civil rights enforcement will likely have little lasting effect. The Reagan administration spent some significant political capital in opposing voting rights legislation, vetoing the Civil Rights Restoration Act, supporting tax breaks for discriminatory private schools, and enabling the Justice Department to launch a frontal assault on preferential hiring. In paying the bill for these unpopular policies, moreover, the Reagan administration received very little in return. Internal discord and external pressures ultimately left the Reagan civil rights agenda in disrepair. The Reagan experience then cautions against serious White House centralization efforts that vary significantly from constituency and legislative expectations. The Reagan experience offers a telling supplement to The Civil Rights Era. With legislative programs in place and hence little opportunity to exert the type of raw power available during an agency's nascent development, White House policymaking operates within a culture of settled expectations. Consequently, the White House must face the external pressures of oversight committees and constituency interests. Centralization, moreover, is complicated by the internal pressures associated with the extraordinary sweep of modern civil rights enforcement. During the Reagan years, competing policy agendas from within the administration seriously curtailed centralization efforts. Yet, contrary to Graham's assertions, the problem of centralization was not one of bureaucrats run amok. Career bureaucrats did not derail the Reagan administration, for White House appointees generally seemed unsympathetic to the careerist's perspective. 197 Instead, the lesson of "full policy cycle" implementation is that internal and external pressures limit the scope of White House centralization. For example, marginal administrative adjustments such as reorganization, resource prioritization, and regulatory simplification appear more successful than direct conflict. In fact, policy blunders associated with the confrontational approach cost the administration dearly. The Bush administration, for example, responded to these Reagan initiatives by distancing itself so much from its Republican predecessor that Reagan's civil rights legacy amounts to very little indeed. In the end, the Reagan administration would have been better served by marginal administrative adjustments such as reorganization, resource prioritization, and regulatory simplification than direct conflict.
The Reagan years, however, do not speak to the futility of White House centralization. Iron triangles, contrary to Graham's depiction, are impediments, not obstructions. The success of the Reagan EEOC is testament to this. Yet, when the political context dictates, the White House must be willing to play the game of subtle bureaucratic maneuvering, and this game promises only a modest payoff. Hence it is in accord with Graham's central contention about the limits of White House power.
IV. CONCLUSION: ALL Is WELL IN MUDVILLE
Proponents of a strong executive are likely to find disheartening the combined lessons of The Civil Rights Era and the Reagan experience. Agencies appear inherently resistant to administration directives; legislative and interest group pressures exacerbate these difficulties; and court opinions appear a disruptive wild card. Furthermore, secondary policymaking devices that work within existing regulatory regimes often serve as the principal mechanism for executive influence. Interestingly, proponents of an imperial Congress, too, are likely to be disturbed by both Graham's account and the Reagan years. The White House appears coequal in the enactment of legislation,198 and agencies (frequently controlled by the executive) play the lead role in both the interpretation and implementation of legislation. Indeed, Congress must resort to a host of oversight techniques ranging from hearings to explicit budgetary constraints -to protect its lawmaking role. Weakness in executive and legislative power, however, does not mean that agencies reign supreme. Presidential power to appoint, submit budgets, approve reorganizations, and monitor rulemaking severely limit agency power. Congress' oversight techniques as well as its ability to modify substantive law also undermine agency control. Furthermore, legislative and executive priorities may be at odds, thus making it impossible for an agency to please both The Civil Rights Era, despite its many strengths, could benefit from a tighter, more analytically focused presentation. The book is too much like a travelogue and too little like a proof. Too much responsibility is placed on the reader to tie together Graham's assertions of agency power, White House centralization, and the rise of group rights. Graham's argument also would benefit from both a fuller treatment of existing topics (EEOC testing, early agency support of numerical proofs) and the inclusion of other relevant topics (race and education, minority business enterprise). Graham also goes too far in using the "imperial presidency" as his normative benchmark. That there is room for improvement, however, does not mean that the book does not succeed admirably. It does, but there is clearly room improvement.
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